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ABSTRACT
Current smart traffic lights (STLs) can provide access to a traffic signal, which a
vehicle, such as an emergency vehicle, can manipulate through a Cooperative Awareness
Message (CAM) object. However, researchers have demonstrated that STLs can be easily
hacked using an abusive CAM object. To address such a weakness, techniques are
presented herein that secure a STL with auxiliary data that is attached to a CAM object,
which can be used by a vehicle on-board unit (OBU) and smartphones. Aspects of the
presented techniques reduce the encryption and decryption overhead that is incurred when
attaching a security header as part of a CAM message. Further aspects of the presented
techniques ensure that the authenticity and integrity of a CAM message can be validated
through a roadside infrastructure (e.g., Roadside Units (RSUs)) and STLs with the help of
a central server.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
The narrative that is presented below employs a number of abbreviations. For
convenience, various abbreviations, along with their associated description, are presented
in Table 1, below.
Abbreviation

Description

CA

Certificate Authority

CAM

Cooperative Awareness Message

ITL

Intelligent traffic light

ITS

Intelligent traffic system
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MQTT

Message Queuing Telemetry Transport

RSU

Roadside Unit

STL

Smart traffic light

TS

Timestamp

V2I

Vehicle to Infrastructure

V2V

Vehicle to Vehicle
Table 1: List of Abbreviations

Additionally, as described herein a ‘CAM packet’ and a ‘CAM object’ may be
understood to refer to the same artifact and, thus, may be referred to interchangeably.
Intelligent traffic lights (ITLs) are critical cyber-physical systems that help smart
cities reduce road congestion and vehicle emissions. Current smart traffic lights (STLs)
provide access to a traffic signal, which a vehicle, such as an emergency vehicle, can
manipulate through a CAM object that is carried via the Message Queuing Telemetry
Transport (MQTT) communication protocol so that, when there is an emergency, the
vehicle will receive a priority green light. However, such a feature has been adopted by
many applications that also allow road users (such as cyclists, bikers, and four wheelers)
to operate a signal while crossing an intersection junction. Additionally, such a capability
also opens up a new frontier of cybersecurity. For example, researchers have demonstrated
that STLs can be easily hacked using CAM objects.
CAM objects inform road users and the roadside infrastructure about each other’s
position, dynamics, and attributes. For a secure CAM message, each packet should be
attached with a header. To protect the message’s authenticity and integrity, such a header
should contain a CA, a digest, and a timestamp. However, a stronger digest necessitates a
better processor and increases the processing time and cost. Moreover, such a secured
CAM can only be generated by a vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). The applications
that use CAM objects don't follow any security structure and employ CAM objects only
for Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) or Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communications.
Android-based applications that employ CAM objects may be used to hack a traffic
light system. As just one example, consider a cyclist paradigm. For such a context, two
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Netherland researchers have demonstrated how a traffic light may be hacked using a cyclist
application.
In particular, the researchers made use of the Frida dynamic instrumentation toolkit
to decompile the CAM objects that were exchanged over the MQTT communication
protocol. Every new MQTT connection was seen as a new cyclist. Multiple Android
applications use only the speed, latitude, and longitude to open up a signal. The researchers
discovered that a single Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) POST request in a loop can
keep a signal green forever and lead to traffic congestion in a city. Additionally, the
researchers claimed that there is no way to distinguish between two different digital cyclists.
Accordingly, it has been recommended that some kind of authentication and authorization
be added in a central server to recognize the messages that are sent from Android
applications and to block those that are from abusive users.
Within the context of the cyclist example that was described above, Figure 1, below,
depicts elements of an illustrative CAM object that is carried over the MQTT
communication protocol in which each new MQTT connection is seen as a new cyclist.

Figure 1: Illustrative CAM Object
To address the types of challenges that were described above, techniques are
presented herein that support attaching auxiliary data (containing identification and
timestamp information) to CAM messages. Such auxiliary data may be generated on the
fly with the help of Roadside Units (RSUs) and can be used by smart traffic lights to check
the authenticity and uniqueness of an application or vehicle that is operating a signal.
Aspects of the techniques presented herein leverage a number of existing
technologies or capabilities. To begin, RSUs are employed to monitor a vehicle, collect
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data, and transfer data to a central traffic management server. Under aspects of the
techniques presented herein, RSUs are used for capturing additional information.
Additionally, the format or structure of a CAM message includes a Special Vehicle
Container field. Under aspects of the techniques presented herein, that field is extended to
support auxiliary data containing a certificate authorization and a timestamp. Finally, while
a CAM message includes a security header, aspects of the techniques presented herein
obviate STL hacking through applications without requiring a security header thus
avoiding any processor dependency.
Detecting and defending traffic system attacks has been the subject of extensive
research. Proposed herein are techniques through which traffic light hacks can be avoided
through use of a smart vehicle and the existing ITS framework.
To obtain a clear visualization of traffic on a road, along with V2V connectivity,
data is collected from infrastructure RSUs and from various other sensors that are placed
on the road. The collected data is disseminated to an Internet of vehicles (IoV) cloud that
helps in managing the city-level traffic. RSUs play an important role in a VANET
environment for privacy preservation. To protect the privacy of a vehicle, the issued
certificate (certificate authorization) must be updated frequently by the RSUs. Figure 2,
below, presents a high-level overview of such an environment.

Figure 2: Illustrative Environment
Aspects of the techniques presented herein support the use of authorized and
authenticated auxiliary data from an RSU that may be added to a CAM object. Android
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applications can use the same object to interact with a smart traffic light system (TLS). An
STL needs to validate the auxiliary data with a central server before opening up the signal.
Use of aspects of the techniques presented herein incurs less encryption and decryption
overhead (which is needed for a CAM security header). The same auxiliary data or
metadata may also be used by VANETs if a security header is absent in CAM objects.
Figure 3, below, portrays elements of the final request packet from a vehicle to a STL.

Certificate
Authorization‐Key

Certificate
Authorization

Timestamp
(Issuing Time)

Figure 3: Exemplary Vehicle-to-STL Packet Request
Aspects of the techniques presented herein leverage various existing frameworks,
such as RSUs, V2I communication, certificates, certificate authorization updates, etc.
Further, aspects of the presented techniques encompass three major steps:


The generation of auxiliary data with physical authentication.



Updates to the auxiliary data (e.g., a certificate authorization and a timestamp).



Auxiliary data validation in a STL before a signal is opened up.

Each of the above steps will be described and illustrated in the narrative that is
presented below.
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A first step includes the generation of auxiliary data with physical authentication.
Physical authentication typically suggests a "seeing and believing" concept. An exemplary
flow for such an approach, as illustrated in Figure 4, below, may include the following
activities:


It may be assumed that some of the RSUs will be equipped with a camera and
an analyzer that can take a picture of the license plate of a moving vehicle and
extract the license information from the picture.



Vehicles without a license plate (such as, for example, a cyclist or an electric
motor vehicle) should carry a radio-frequency identification (RFID) tag for
physical authentication.



Each interested vehicle may send a GET request with its vehicle number or
RFID number to retrieve a key pair, a certificate authorization, and metadata.



When an RSU receives the GET request, the RSU validates the vehicle number
with captured license information. If the capture is available within an RSU,
then the RSU generates a key-pair, a certificate authorization, a generation time
stamp, and a certificate authorization expiry time.

Certificate Authorization + timestamp (authorization generation
time) + authorization expiry time

Certificate Authorization get request + name plate details

Figure 4: Illustrative Authentication Activities
A second step may include providing updates to the auxiliary data (e.g., a certificate
authorization and a timestamp). For example, a generated certificate authorization may
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only be valid only within a local area and it must be updated in the next RSU. The
certificate authorization updating flow, as shown in Figure 5, below, may include the
following activities:


Once a vehicle obtains an initial valid key pair and certificate, the vehicle can
refresh them in the next RSU.



The local or next RSU can validate and re-issue a fresh certificate authorization.



An application can send an UPDATE request with the existing data (e.g., a key
pair, a certificate authorization, and timestamp details).



Thereafter, the RSU can validate the key and certificate. If such a validation is
successful, then the RSU can generate a new key, its own certificate
authorization, and current time stamp details.

Such a process (of updating the certificate authorization and metadata) needs to
continue until it hits the local area where traffic signals are available.

RSU re‐issues a new certificate authorization
with timestamp

Certificate authorization update request
with old certificate authorization

Figure 5: Illustrative Update Activities
A third step involves auxiliary data validation in a STL before a signal can be
accessed by a vehicle. For example, a vehicle that is interested in accessing a signal
automatically, without stopping at a junction, can send a CAM object with a certificate
authorization and timestamp details to the traffic light. The validations that take place
within a STL may include the following activities, which are illustrated in Figure 6, below:

7
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2021

6697
8

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 4741 [2021]



The STL sends the message to a central traffic system server. The central server
confirms if there are any security header attached to the CAM object.
According to aspects of the techniques presented herein, a CAM object will not
include a security header.



The CAM message will be opened to verify if a special vehicle container is
available.



If a special vehicle container is present then the server validates the certificate
authorization and stores the certificate authorization and time stamp as a keyvalue pair in a database.



If the same message again reaches the STL, it queries the database and confirms
that the packet is already processed. Accordingly, the message can be dropped,
which can avoid a replay of the same CAM message.

Certificate
authorization and
TS

Certificate
authorization

Figure 6: Illustrative Validation Activities
Figure 7, below, presents elements of an overall workflow according to aspects of
the techniques presented herein.
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Certificate Authorization and
Timestamp update Res
Certificate Authorization and
Timestamp update Req
Validate Certificate
Authorization with
central RSU

Certificate Authorization,
key, and Timestamp

Certificate
Authorization –
Timestamp Validation

Certificate
Authorization get Req

Figure 7: Exemplary Workflow
As described and illustrated in the narrative that was presented above, aspects of
the techniques presented herein provide several features and advantages that can be
realized within STL systems. For example, lightweight auxiliary data that contains a
certificate authorization and a timestamp can be included in CAM messages sent by
applications, which often cannot afford to attach a security header. Advantageously, the
certificate authorization and the timestamp can be generated between an RSU and an
application using physical verification (e.g., via license plates, RFID tags, etc.) provided
by RSUs (e.g., using cameras, etc. at the RSUs). The auxiliary data can be refreshed at
each RSU using the physical verification to avoid replay attacks. Finally, the authenticity
and integrity of CAM messages can be validated for signal operation at a STL using the
auxiliary data.
In summary, techniques have been presented herein that secure a STL with
auxiliary data that is attached to a CAM object which can be used by a vehicle on-board
unit (OBU) and smartphones. Aspects of the presented techniques reduce the encryption
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and decryption overhead that is incurred when attaching a security header as part of a CAM
message. Further, aspects of the presented techniques ensure that the authenticity and
integrity of CAM messages can be validated through the roadside infrastructure (e.g., RSUs)
and STLs with the help of a central server.
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